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DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS:
'TRUSTEE FOR THE POOR' or 'GUARDIAN OF RATIONALITY'? 
by
P A BLACK
Mr Vice-Chancellor, colleagues and friends, I am very honoured 
indeed to be able to give this inaugural lecture tonight. My association 
with Rhodes University has been a happy and fruitful one and I would like 
to thank all those who have made this possible.
Both development economics and the economic development of the Third 
World have recently come under attack from two distinct quarters. On the 
one hand it is argued that development scientists have deviated too far 
from the long established and time-honoured path followed by orthodox 
economists. Others claim the opposite, namely, that the profession has 
stuck too closely to this well-beaten track often missing out on the 
things that really matter in development. The issue at hand is not 
merely a question of whether a visitor to this country ought to follow 
the main routes indicated on the map of the South African Tourist Board; 
or whether his itinerary should also include Soweto, Salem and the Royal 
Hotel in Montagu. There is much more to the debate than meets the eye, 
as I shall try to show to you tonight.
The failings and frailties of development economics have lately been 
attributed to the inability or unwillingness of economists to be what 
Kenneth Arrow (1974, p 16) once called the "guardian of rationality".
2All too often development economists have failed to appreciate the basic 
neoclassical tenet of relative scarcity when analysing the problems or 
advising the governments of poor countries. It is the neglect of neo-
classical theory generally and of modern welfare economics in particular, 
that lies at the root of the many ineffectual and largely misguided 
planning models and policies adopted by Third-World governments. As 
Deepak Lal (1983, p 103) recently noted:
"The many problems facing developing economies are not those 
flowing from the inevitable imperfections of a market economy. 
(Rather they are) ... the policy-induced distortions created 
by (the) irrational dirigisme promoted by development economics".
The view from the left holds that economic theory in the conven­
tional sense is largely irrelevant to the problem of underdevelopment. 
Adherents to this view contend that received micro- and macroeconomic 
theory should either be changed extensively, or abandoned completely and 
replaced by a conceptual structure whose domain extends beyond the 
"economic", and whose methodology and basic premises would be more 
appropriate to actual conditions prevailing in the poor countries. It is 
only by broadening the scope of his analysis that the economist can ever 
hope to fill his proper role as "trustee for the poor".
Paul Streeten (1983, p 875) once said that "the world is divided 
into two groups of people: those who divide the world into two groups of
people, and those who don't". Lest I be classified as one of the former, 
let me assure you that I take both pride and pleasure in the rich 
diversity of ideas, nuances and modus operandi encountered in the field
3of development economics. Indeed, if we are to understand and appreciate 
the nature of the polemical discourse referred to above, it will be 
necessary to know what development economics is all about to begin with. 
I therefore propose to provide you with a bird's eye view of some of the 
more important contributions that have been made in this field; it 
should then be possible to address the question posed in the title of my 
lecture.
I
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association 
Arthur Lewis (1984) suggested that development economics has been in 
decline ever since the "spirited decades of the 1950's and 1960's". He 
maintained that the output of new development theories was at its highest 
during this period. My own view is that the "innovations and contro­
versies" to which Lewis referred - "spirited" as they may have been - 
were not particularly novel. Most were derived from or availed them­
selves of neoclassical price theory and classical and Keynesian macro- 
economic theory. The same can be said of recent developments in the 
field since the late 1960's.
In offering such an alternative interpretation, I am not trying to 
detract from individual achievements in the field or to lower the 
scientific status of the sub-discipline. Rather, the many attempts that 
have been made to refine and extend existing theory in accordance with 
the shift in professional focus may be viewed as a good example of
4scientific progress in the Kuhnian sense of the word; that is, they 
represent a series of problem-solving activities conducted within a given 
analytical framework. Indeed, there is much agreement within the 
profession that development economics has conferred significant external 
benefits upon other members of the economics family as a whole. These 
include various investigations into the operation of dual labour markets 
which have become part of the curricula of labour economists; the role 
of multinational companies in the world economy which is now being 
studied extensively by industrial economists; several analyses of 
international trade and finance for small, open economies which have 
become the concern of international economists; and the structuralist 
theory of inflation in the field of macroeconomics. It is tempting to 
add that many of these contributions were made only in the aftermath of 
the "spirited decades".
But development economics also has a distinctive character of its 
own. It differs from the neoclassical, Marxist and other mainstream 
theories in its basic methodological approach to the analysis of real- 
world phenomena. The main body of development economics has been 
referred to as a "structuralist" field of study. According to Hollis 
Chenery (1975) "structuralism" arose from a general dissatisfaction with 
the limited predictive power of mainstream theories when applied to the 
conditions in Third-World countries. As he (1975, p 313) puts it: "The 
neo-Marxist policy recommendations suffer from the same defects as the 
neoclassical in that they are implicit in their initial assumptions 
rather than being derived from an analysis based on empirical estimates 
of the underlying structural relations".
5On this view, structuralists may indeed be said to include such 
'establishment' economists as Keynes, Joan Robinson and Chamberlin, as 
well as several 'revisionist' economists in the areas of industrial 
economics, labour economics and macroeconomic theory. In the field of 
development economics itself the structuralist approach is associated 
with the names of Lewis, Eckaus, Prebisch, Myrdal and many others. These 
economists view the development problem as a consequence of certain 
structural rigidities and market imperfections which are present in one 
form or another in most developing countries. And it is within this 
context that I now turn to consider more precisely some of the highlights 
of my subject.
II
During the immediate postwar period several economists approached 
the world-wide problem of economic backwardness in a manner reminiscent 
of the old classical school. As they saw it, the distinguishing charac­
teristic of a poor country was that it had not yet reached a so-called 
minimum threshold level of development, beyond which it would be possible 
to achieve a self-sustaining rise in living standards. In the words of 
Richard Nelson (1956), poor countries were caught in a "low-level equili­
brium trap". In a seminal article entitled "Problems of Industriali­
sation of Eastern and South-Eastern Europe", Paul Rosenstein-Rodan (1943) 
argued that the individual entrepreneur in a poor country does not 
realise that his own productive activity may confer an external benefit
6on other members in society, for example, by lowering the production 
costs of other entrepreneurs operating in the same location. To the 
extent that he considers only the private returns and costs of his 
enterprise, the same entrepreneur will be unaware of the fact that he may 
also benefit from the actions of others. If private investors do indeed 
underestimate the social benefits associated with their own investment 
plans, it seems unlikely that sufficient investment will be forthcoming 
within a relatively free market environment.
In a similar vein, Ragnar Nurkse (1953) introduced the notion of the 
vicious circle of poverty to the literature. In his book, Problems of 
Capital Formation in Underdeveloped Countries, he (p 5) explained it as 
follows:
"... the small capacity to save results from the low level of 
real income. The low real income is a reflection of low 
productivity, which in its turn is due largely to the lack 
of capital. The lack of capital is a result of the small 
capacity to save, and so the circle is complete. A situation 
of this sort ... can be summed up in the trite proposition:
'a country is poor because it is poor'."
According to Nurkse, the solution depends on a substantial increase 
in capital investment across a broad range of industries. Such a "big 
push" strategy of "balanced growth" would provide the stimulus necessary 
to break the vicious circle. Not only would balanced growth generate 
internal and external economies of scale but it would at the same time 
create the demand necessary to sustain it. In short, supply would create
7its own demand and lead the economy through the various Rostovian stages 
of economic growth (Rostow, 1960).
The basic idea emerging from these theories can be traced to the 
writings of the classical school, and more specifically to Adam Smith's 
(1776) well-known theory of specialisation. Smith argued that the 
division of labour into specialised productive activities is a necessary 
condition for productivity growth in most countries: "... when workers 
specialise in specific activities rather than undertake several 
production tasks (at the same time) they can collectively produce more 
with the same effort" (Baldwin, 1972, p 26). For this to be possible, 
however, workers must be furnished with specialised tools and equipment, 
which can only be accomplished by means of a continuous process of 
capital investment. This in turn requires an adequate volume of saving 
and a market that is sufficiently large to absorb the total product.
Turn this argument on its head and you have the original version of 
the vicious circle of poverty. The only difference between Smith and the 
"big push" theorists lies in their respective policy prescriptions. 
Whereas Smith believed that an "invisible hand" would guide a free and 
unfettered market economy to a state of bliss, Rosenstein-Rodan, Nurkse 
and others, writing in the aftermath of the Keynesian revolution, 
advocated a more active role for government in the economic development 
of the Third World.
The structuralist nature of development economics is perhaps best
8represented by several studies which have attempted to modify and extend 
the neoclassical, Keynesian and Marxist theories. Gunnar Myrdal's (1957) 
theory of cumulative causation, for example, discards the neoclassical 
assumption of constant returns to scale and effectively introduces 
increasing returns in, say, a given geographical region of a country; in 
contrast to the neoclassical theory, he thus envisages a cumulative 
process of regional divergence in terms of the income level per worker. 
According to Myrdal, any given increase in a region's income is assumed 
to have a dual effect on other regions, in the form of his well-known 
spread and backwash effects. The claim that the latter usually outweighs 
the former is largely due to the existence of regional differences in 
economies of scale.1 Specifically, suppose an autonomous increase in the 
income of, say, region Y induces increasing returns and raises its 
marginal productivities and factor prices relative to those in the 
backward region, X. If factor mobility is assumed to depend on the 
corresponding price differentials only, then production factors will move 
in one direction only setting in motion a cumulative process of income 
expansion in region Y at the expense of region X. In the absence of 
"counterveiling forces", this process would continue ad infinitum 
augmenting regional differences in scale economies, real income and 
employment.
When it was first applied to the problem of economic under­
development (Myrdal, 1944), the theory of cumulative causation initiated 
a fairly radical departure from the ruling neoclassical orthodoxy. The 
basic idea behind the theory has recently re-emerged in various writings
9associated with the so-called dependency or "neo-Marxist" school. 
These writers contend that past colonial empires and "neo-colonialists" 
like the multinational company have played an important part in both 
initiating and perpetuating a process of "development of under­
development". For example, through various forms of international trade, 
investment and technological transfer, multinational companies establish 
a so-called "enclave" economy within the typical developing country, 
which eventually becomes fully integrated with the "international 
capitalist system". The chief function of the enclave is that of profit 
(or "surplus value") maximisation, which it does inter alia by partially 
destroying traditional (handicraft) industries and retarding or 
distorting indigenous processes of social and economic change. Implicit 
in the dependency argument is the belief that backwash or, more 
precisely, polarisation effects, far outweigh what spread effects may 
emanate from the enclave economy, at least during the early stages of 
development.
2
Several theorists have tried to explain the development problem in 
terms of the specific production processes used in developing countries. 
Richard Eckaus' (1955) explanation of the "Factor-proportions Problem in 
Underdeveloped Areas" is based on the "alternative" assumption of limited
3
factor substitutability. In a typical developing country, he argues, 
there are either in fact or entrepreneurs perceive there to be fixed 
technical coefficients with a relatively high capital-labour ratio. 
While this type of production function does in fact have a long history 
in the economics literature, it may also be viewed as an alternative to 
the non-linear function used by neoclassical economists.
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The origin of the factor-proportions problem lies in what Hans 
Singer (1970-71, p 64) has called the system of international techno­
logical dualism, or "... the fact that knowledge is accumulated by the 
richer countries, in the richer countries, and in respect of the problems 
of the richer countries". This monopoly of knowledge enables the 
developed countries to control both the volume and composition of 
technical inventions and innovations in the world at large, as well as 
their eventual transfer to developing countries through international 
trade and investment. However, since most innovations are initially 
planned in and designed for rich countries where labour tends to be 
relatively scarce and expensive, their application generally requires 
large quantities of capital relative to labour. It is the unadapted 
application of such innovations, coupled with the failure of 
multinational companies to search for alternative techniques more suited 
to conditions in poor countries, that has led Eckaus (1955), Higgins 
(1958) and others to observe that production in these countries is often 
characterised by fixed proportions of a relatively capital intensive 
nature —  despite, that is, the relative abundance and cheapness of 
labour.
The employment implications of the factor-proportions problem are 
straightforward: consider a one-good economy in which the production of 
any quantity of the good requires the use of, say, 3 units of capital per 
labourer. If, in fact, capital and labour happen to be available in the 
ratio of 1,5 to 1, then for every 3 units of capital employed there would
be 1 unemployed person. Clearly, under these conditions the employment 
of labour would be limited not only by a lack of capital but also by the 
limited degree of substitutability between the factors of production.
Much of the postwar literature on economic development has focussed 
on the imperfectly competitive structure of the product and factor 
markets in developing countries. The monopoly power of foreign business 
concerns has been a characteristic feature of the so-called "opening-up 
process" in developing countries. Hla Myint (1954) argues, for example, 
that monopolistic conditions affect virtually every person in a 
developing country, whether he is a peasant producer, an unskilled worker 
or a consumer of final goods. In the international context, Prebisch 
(1950, 1959) has shown how differences in the structure of markets 
between developed and developing countries may turn the terms of trade 
against the latter ; using a two-sector model, Bhagwati (1958) has 
demonstrated how such a deterioration in the terms of trade could bring 
about a net decrease in the welfare of the countries concerned. 
Likewise, import substitution policies have tended to restrict 
competition and encourage the growth of monopolies in most developing 
countries during the postwar period.6 On a theoretical level at least it 
is possible to show that, compared to a competitive market, the effect of 
monopoly ceteris paribus is to limit production and raise the prices of 
most goods and services in the economy. These arguments therefore 
suggest that the problems of unemployment and low real incomes may be 
partly attributed to the monopolistic structure of markets in developing
12
countries.
The labour market has been the focus of several dualist theories of 
development. The most famous of these is undoubtedly Arthur Lewis' 
(1954) analysis of "Economic Development with Unlimited Supplies of 
Labour".7 The model generally views development as a relatively painless 
process according to which "surplus" labour is transferred from a low- 
productivity or non-capitalist sector, to a newly emerging, more 
productive capitalist sector. This transfer of labour is supposed to
occur at a minimum subsistent wage, which enables capitalists to save, 
invest and continue employing surplus labour during the initial stages of 
development. Economic development is thus made synonymous with increased 
saving and capital investment which is, in turn, facilitated by a 
perfectly elastic supply of labour.
The Lewis model was one of the first to highlight the peculiarities 
of the factor markets in poor countries. It is now generally recognised 
that the prices of capital, labour and other production factors do not as 
a rule reflect their respective relative scarcities. Labour tends to be 
relatively overpriced due to the existence of fixed or rigid wages 
determined inter alia by law, social custom and other institutional 
factors. Likewise, capital is said to be relatively underpriced because 
of overvalued exchange rates, artificially low interest rates and various
forms of tax exemption. Not only do such distortions encourage the use 
of "inappropriate" production techniques, but they have also contributed 
to widespread inefficiencies in a large number of developing countries.
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In a recent survey of 30 developing countries, for example, the World 
Bank (1983, p 57) found that "... during the 1970s those countries with 
the worst distortions experienced significantly lower domestic saving and 
lower output per unit of investment, thus leading to slower growth".
The effect on employment of these price distortions tends to be 
magnified by certain spatial patterns of labour mobility. Todaro (1969, 
1971), Gugler (1969), Stiglitz (1982) and others9 have all shown how the 
flow of labour to the cities has added to the problem of urban unemploy­
ment and increased per capita income differentials within developing 
countries. The Todaro model in particular provides a rational explana­
tion for the massive migration of labour to the cities in spite of rising 
levels of urban unemployment. The rapid rate of urbanisation has also 
given rise to numerous attempts to explain the segmented nature of the 
urban labour market in poor countries. For example, in the absence of an 
adequate social security system the prospect of becoming openly 
unemployed in the urban areas is not an attractive one. But many new 
arrivals in the city join the so-called "unorganised" or informal sector 
where they are able to make ends meet while waiting for the chance of 
securing a well-paid job in the formal sector.10 Although the informal 
sector itself may be viewed as a "relatively efficient, productive and 
creative" means of survival (ILO, 1972, p 51), its growth potential and 
ability to compete with the formal sector are nevertheless limited by 
several factors. These include its lack of legal protection coupled with 
potential harassment by the authorities, a deficient infrastructure, the 
high risk of business failure, and limited access to formal financial
institutions.
14
This lack of competition between the constituent segments of the
urban labour market may be partly responsible for the observed
differences in wage rates and working conditions among persons of similar
skill belonging to the same occupational groups.11 While comparatively
high wages and job security in the formal or "primary" sector have
12traditionally been attributed to education and on-the-job training, and 
more recently to social and customary procedures and to turnover and 
other efficiency considerations, it is in the urban informal or 
"secondary" sector that the problem of poverty manifests itself most 
visibly.
It is partly this spectrum of price distortions, rural-urban 
migration and the resultant segmentation of the urban labour market which 
prompted Michael Lipton's (1977) recent attack on the Urban Bias in World 
Development; and which caused Todaro (1977, p 199) to remark: "... it
is now becoming painfully apparent that the conventional wisdom of 
economic theory, which placed top priority on the rapid accumulation of 
capital as the key to successful economic progress in the 1950s and 
1960s, has led to the serious employment predicament of the 1970s".
From a macroeconomic perspective, the profession has witnessed the 
emergence of a structuralist theory of inflation for developing 
countries. According to Sunkel (1958), Olivera (1964) and other members
15
of the Latin American structuralist school14, inflationary price rises 
have been an inevitable outcome of the poor countries' attempt to promote 
industrialisation in the face of certain structural constraints. There 
are essentially three such constraints, namely, the inelastic supply of 
foodstuffs, a chronic shortage of foreign exchange and a government 
budget constraint. Industrial expansion necessarily raises the demand 
for food which, given inelastic supply conditions, leads to an increase 
in price rather than in the level of real income. Similarly, industrial 
development usually goes hand in hand with an increase in the demand for 
imported materials. But given low export earnings, the result is often a 
depreciation of the exchange rate and a consequential rise in the 
domestic price of imported commodities. A policy of industrialisation 
also requires a commitment on the part of government to provide the 
necessary social and physical infrastructure. In the absence of 
sufficient sources of revenue, however, this usually translates itself 
into a growing budget deficit and a concomitant increase in the money 
supply and/or interest rates.
It is at this stage that the so-called propagating factors come into 
play. Faced with higher food and import prices trade unions attempt to 
redress the balance by enforcing a compensating increase in nominal 
wages. At the same time as employers are faced with rising import prices 
and higher interest charges, they now also have to foot a growing wage 
bill. Given their monopolistic power, however, they are able to pass 
these cost increases on to consumers in the form of higher prices, thus 
triggering an inflationary spiral of successive wage and price increases. 
All this is made possible by a continuous increase in the money supply
16
which, in contrast to the monetarist view, is considered to be a symptom 
of the basic problem rather than the cause of the inflation itself.
On the policy front, the Latin American structuralists also part 
company with Keynesian economists insofar as they reject their short term 
cure for inflation. Poor countries cannot afford the luxury of a 
contractionary monetary or fiscal policy aimed at stabilising the economy 
in the short run. Policy induced changes in the interest rate, exchange 
rate and tax structure tend to have a direct impact on the cost of 
production and, hence, on the supply of goods and services. A contrac­
tionary monetary policy may thus be expected to curb both demand and
supply and precipitate a severe recession with little or no effect on the 
15rate of inflation. Structuralists maintain that the cost in terms of 
rising unemployment of such a policy is too high for countries already 
experiencing inordinately high levels of both structural and frictional 
unemployment. Instead they advocate increased foreign aid and 
international finance as the means of bringing about the necessary 
structural change, while some also support a prices and incomes policy.
On the whole, our cursory glance at the main body of development 
economics would appear to confirm its structuralist nature. Most 
existing theories of economic underdevelopment adopt an analytical 
approach which in effect amounts to relaxing some of the chief assump­
tions associated with the neoclassical, Keynesian and Marxist theories.
17
Development theories accordingly yield predictions which are signifi­
cantly different from those emanating from their more conventional 
counterparts. In short, they seek to explain the problems of unemploy­
ment, low incomes and inequality in terms of the operation of input and 
output markets both at the micro- and macroeconomic levels, as well as in 
relation to the production process itself.
But what puts them apart from the neoclassical theory in particular, 
is their mistrust of the free market system and belief in the ability of 
government to relieve the poor of their misery. The policy proposals 
stemming from these theories are many and varied. They include the use 
of sophisticated econometric models as planning guidelines; the 
provision of basic infrastructural facilities deemed necessary for rapid 
industrialisation; the establishment of public enterprises and marketing 
boards coupled with the use of indirect taxes and subsidies in order to 
provide for the basic needs of poor people and thereby effect a 
redistribution of income from the rich to the poor; the imposition of 
import tariffs as a means of improving the terms of trade and of 
protecting infant industries against foreign competition; and a plea for 
greater foreign assistance together with the formation of a so-called new 
international economic order. It is at the level of policy that most of 
the wrathful criticisms of development economics have been directed.
III
Just as Keynesians and neo-Keynesians have been under attack and 
pushed off the centre of the stage in macroeconomics, so the inter­
18
ventionist bent of development economics has been questioned by several
economists belonging to the neoclassical school. The name most closely
associated with the neoclassical approach to development is that of Peter
Bauer (1963, 1971, 1981). According to him there is nothing fortuitous
about the fact that countries which have abided by the principles of the
market have generally grown more rapidly than those opting for an inter- 
o p
ventionist or centrally planned economic system. While the former have 
allowed the incentive-providing mechanisms of the market to run their 
course, they have also benefitted a great deal from maintaining and 
expanding contact with industrially advanced countries through the 
operation of multinational companies, the transfer of technology and free 
international trade.
In a provocative and influential essay entitled "The Poverty of 
'Development Economics'", Deepak Lal (1983) referred to 'development 
economics' as a "dirigiste dogma". According to him the interventionist 
policies advocated by economists and adopted by Third-World governments 
have made matters worse rather than better. Many of the distortions 
undermining the economies of Third-World countries have been induced by 
the paternalistic attitudes and irrational policies of government, and 
should not be viewed as manifestations of the basic imperfections of the 
market mechanism. A flippant though thoughtful remark by Ian Little (in 
Streeten, 1983, p 879) is worth repeating: "I see the story as one of a
battle between structuralists who see the world as bounded and flat, and 
consisting of stick-in-the-muds who have to be drilled, - and 
neoclassicists who see it as round and full of enterprising people who
19
will organise themselves in i fairly effective manner!"
Lal and others maintain that the policies of Third-World govern­
ments have proved to be singularly inappropriate in that they have tended 
to aggravate rather than correct the inevitable imperfections of the 
market system. The policy of tariff protection - or industrialisation 
through import substitution - is a case in point. It was originally 
envisaged as a means of arresting the decline in the terms of trade and 
of protecting infant industries with a view to creating more job 
opportunities for a growing population. In practice, however, its impact 
on the economy has turned out to be quite different. Much of the 
available evidence indicates that protectionist policies have led to a 
substantial increase in the cost of living, while at the same time 
suppressing competition in the import-competing sector, limiting the 
growth of food production, exports and employment, and weakening the 
balance of payments position of developing countries.16
Similarly, monetarist economists argue that inflationary price rises 
in developing countries are due to excess demand pressures brought about 
by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies.17 The so-called 
"structural" constraints are not really structural at all but the direct 
result of the government's attempt to alleviate the effects of inflation, 
rather than remove its basic causes. The inability of the food producing 
sector to respond to increased demand, for example, is due to a 
deliberate attempt on the part of government to keep food prices low and 
thus to protect urban consumers from the ravages of inflation. The lack 
of foreign exchange is again caused by the government's policy of
20
maintaining an overvalued exchange rate in order to prevent the prices of 
imported materials from rising. As the monetarists see it, the ultimate 
solution to the problem lies in a concerted effort to curb the growth of 
the money supply and hence to remove excess demand pressures in the 
economy. Once the rate of inflation has been brought under control the 
need for compensating actions by the government, and with it numerous 
artificial constraints too, would have disappeared altogether.
It is important to note that Deepak Lal's attack on development 
economics does not imply support for the laissez faire doctrine. The 
debate has long ceased to be about the virtues or vices of an unfettered, 
free and largely competitive economy. To Lal (1983, p 6) the real issue 
is "... the form and extent of government intervention, not its complete 
absence". Where developing countries have gone wrong, according to Lal, 
is in their application of dirigiste policies based on principles that 
clash with those of modern welfare economics. Irrespective of the policy 
objective(s) agreed upon, welfare economics, and the theory of second 
best in particular, provides us with a consistent set of rules by means 
of which the respective relative merits of alternative policies may be 
judged. For example, it is theoretically possible to achieve an optimal 
distribution of income through a system of lump-sum taxes and subsidies 
without suffering any loss of production efficiency in the process. 
Likewise, optimal efficiency can be attained by means of indirect taxes 
and subsidies designed to offset those structural and institutional 
distortions which cannot be eliminated directly; as Samuelson (1947, p 
252) puts it, in such cases "two wrongs do make a right". Referring once
21
again to the policy of tar iff protection, Corden (1957), Johnson (1965) 
and Bhagwati (1971), among others, have shown that while the same 
objectives may be achieved by the use of domestic subsidies and taxes, 
the latter policy would nevertheless entail a smaller sacrifice in terms 
of real income foregone than a tax on imports.
To return to the main point of the argument: development economists
and national planners have generally ignored the second best principle in 
welfare economics, and invoked a range of policy measures which have 
resulted in a 3rd, 4th or - if you like - an nth best solution. The fact 
that free and uncontrolled markets may not operate in an efficient and 
equitable manner does not render neoclassical welfare economics obsolete. 
On the contrary, as Deepak Lal (1983, p 106) notes: "... it is neo-
classical economics which has provided the justification for rational 
dirigisme, by showing that there are methods of 'planning' through the 
price mechanism which may be both feasible and desirable."
But such theoretical niceties aside, recent evidence on the economic 
performance of newly industrialised countries like Hong Kong, Taiwan, 
Singapore and South Korea - collectively known as the 'Gang of Four' 
does appear to lend support to Lal's thesis. The spectacular successes 
of these countries have traditionally been ascribed to the outward-
looking, market oriented policies pursued by their governments. But this
1 ftis only half the truth. Several recent studies indicate that the 
growth of these countries can be explained in terms of many other factors
too. These include various fortuitous developments in the world economy 
19at large ; particular geo-political relationships with the USA; the
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formation of domestic political structures and class relationships 
conducive to economic progress; and, more importantly, what Lal might 
call the right kind of state intervention. The latter have included the 
selective use of export incentives together with import tariffs and 
quotas, various restrictions on foreign investment and a floating 
exchange rate. It can be argued, for example, that the use made of 
export incentives in South Korea and Taiwan amounted to a second best 
means of counteracting the effects of prevailing import restrictions 
(Lal, 1983, pp 45-47).
Generally speaking, these arguments would seem to provide a good 
example of the broad validity and relevance of the neoclassical theory of 
general equilibrium and welfare. This view is not based on a belief that 
the underlying assumptions of the theory are in any sense "realistic", or 
that its behavioural relationships are always capable of producing 
accurate predictions; as Friedman (1966) has pointed out, the theory 
does not in fact lay claim to any such properties. Rather, the use­
fulness of the theory derives from its capacity to accommodate a large 
variety of alternative assumptions. It is this built-in flexibility that 
enables it to yield alternative predictions that are applicable to many 
different real-world situations.
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IV
Economists belonging to the "radical" school believe that economic 
theory, by itself, is largely irrelevant to the particular problems 
facing a poor country. Most existing theories of underdevelopment are 
considered too narrowly based on the so-called purely "economic" 
determinants of the development problem. It is held that economists too 
are inadequately trained to recognise, let alone analyse, the social, 
institutional and political factors that usually determine economic 
progress in the developing countries. While such an "omission" may be 
permissible in the context of industrially advanced countries, the 
relative importance of 'non-economic' variables in developing countries 
renders a purely economic approach largely meaningless.
At a methodological level, economists stand accused of trying to 
emulate the positivist methods of inquiry adopted by their colleagues 
in the natural sciences. Whilst the positivist approach is arguably an 
appropriate way of exploring the "hard facts" of nature, it often yields 
imperfect and sometimes even misleading results when applied to the study 
of human behaviour. The reason is that all observations in the social 
sciences are necessarily "value-laden" and thus tend to vary with the 
particular preconceptions and personal biases of the observer. This 
forms the basis of what Popper (1959) termed the 'problem of induction', 
and which has given rise to the holist approach in institutional 
economics and to various empirical research methods applied in the fields 
of sociology, anthropology and social psychology. The observer is thus 
expected to acquire a so-called "inside view" in order to understand 
human behaviour from the perspective of his subject's own frame of
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reference. The philosopher of science, Keat (1981, p 138), described it 
as follows: "Social reality may be seen to consist of rule-governed
meaningful activity; and the understanding of this must involve an 
implicit dialogue between theorist and theorised, since the way in which 
the latter conceive of their own activities is itself a central part of 
social reality".
I am reminded here of Lilian Moore's delightful little poem about 
the Witch Child's idea of a bedtime story:
"Tell me a story",
Says Witch's Child,
"About the Beast 
So fierce and wild.
About a Ghost
That shrieks and groans.
A Skeleton
That rattles bones.
About a Monster 
Crawly-creepy.
Something nice 
to make me sleepy!
(Lilian Moore, See My Lovely Poison Ivy, Atheneum Publishers, 1975).
You will no doubt agree that even the most sublime scientist, interested 
in the sleeping habits of the Witch Child, faces a pretty daunting task 
in securing "an implicit dialogue" with his subject!
At a more terrestrial level, radical economists agree with the neo- 
classicists that the villain of the piece in developing countries is the
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government. Under international capitalism, it is argued, the govern­
ments of most Third-World countries enter into a collaborative 
relationship with foreign and other private owners of the means of 
production. Such an arrangement suits both parties. Multinational 
companies need the cooperation of government in order to protect their 
own position of dominance against potential rivals. Likewise, the 
government depends on multinational companies for an adequate supply of 
foreign capital and a stable balance of payments position, as well as to 
further its own material well-being. It is largely for this reason that 
many developing countries have pursued a strategy of import substitution 
while at the same time maintaining an overvalued exchange rate in order 
to facilitate the entry of foreign capital. What these policies have 
achieved domestically, however, is to encourage multinational companies 
to initiate and expand the production of western-style luxury goods by 
means of inappropriate, usually capital-intensive techniques, thus 
precipitating a process of growing inequalities within the poor 
countries. Referring to the discriminatory effects of government policy 
in poor countries, Thomas Weisskopf (1983, p 896) recently suggested that 
the economist should strive not only to understand the nature of the 
social and political forces determining development, but should also "... 
participate in political action and contribute to movements for 
fundamental change".
The need for interdisciplinary research in the social sciences has
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been widely recognised during the past two decades. But the efforts made 
in this field thus far have not met with much success. Some writers have 
merely brought together under one umbrella a variety of individual con­
tributions without actually trying to integrate them into a systematic 
whole. Others have again tested various cross-sectional correlations 
which, even when found to be significant, do not tell us much about the 
causality or dynamic processes determining the underlying behavioural 
relationships. Many have also tried to take on too much often 
recounting real-world complexities in a rather indeterminate and
equivocal manner, thus limiting both the explanatory value and general
22usefulness of their respective stories, conjectures and theories. As 
George Stigler (1963, p 16) once remarked: "It is all too easy to find
specialists whose logical ability and standards of evidence collapse when 
they step outside their specialties".
There are presumably many reasons for this apparant failure. 
Stigler (1963) might say, for example, that the necessary knowledge and 
expertise are rarely found under one skull. Similarly, Dudley Seers 
(1963b) would blame the "chauvinistic" nature of educational systems in 
rich and poor countries alike, while Streeten (1972) might point to such 
attitudinal characteristics as ideological bias, vested interest and a 
preference for analytical convenience. Whatever the reasons may be, few 
would deny that the potential for meaningful contributions in this area 
does exist. It should not be too difficult to indicate the precise 
manner in which the existence of an extended family system may affect 
entrepreneurial behaviour, labour mobility and the savings propensity; 
or to specify the parameters in which particular forms of social
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stratification and political organisation may undermine the operation of 
product and factor markets - for example, through various entry 
requirements, licensing practices, land proclamations, pricing 
strategies, tender preferences and through the advancement of individuals 
on the basis of factors other than job-specific ability.
While such an endeavour may well require an "inside view" of the 
individual, community or institution under consideration, the research 
techniques and methodology used for this purpose need not - and in my 
view should not - be limited to empirical observation only. "Letting the 
facts speak for themselves" is neither practicable nor desirable if 
carried too far. The success of interdisciplinary research will 
ultimately depend on the ability of social scientists to separate the 
chaff from the wheat by choosing the most appropriate set of significant 
variables from among the multitude of real-world data. The plea for 
inter-disciplinary research is really an argument for a more judicious 
application of the ceteris paribus rule - which is arguably a necessary 
condition for the derivation of generally valid and useful theories and 
narratives in the social sciences.
Mr Vice-Chancellor, there is no reason why the economist should not 
broaden the scope of his analysis if it will help him to become a more 
effective 'trustee for the poor'. But there is every reason to expect 
that the quality of this trusteeship will depend on the extent to which 
he fulfills his task as the 'guardian of rationality'. It seems both
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ft
pertinent and fitting to let the previous incumbent of this Chair, Mike 
Truu (1974, pp 24 and 14), have the last word: "The economist has not
only a professional but also a moral commitment to the society of which 
he is a member. (But) no political reform can reverse the relationship 
between multiple needs and scarce resources, or render the processes of 
production and distribution completely independent of each other".
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* FOOTNOTES
1. See Myrdal (1957, p 27), Kaldor (1970) and Dixon and Thirlwall 
(1975). A two-sector application of Myrdal's theory is provided in 
Black (1981, pp 42-46).
2. See Baran (1957), Frank (1967, 1975), Sunkel (1969, 1973), Furtado 
(1970), Dos Santos (1970, 1973), Szentes (1971) and Cardoso (1972).
3. See also Fukuoka (1955) and Higgins (1968).
4. See Stewart (1972, 1974) and Helleiner (1975). Useful contribu­
tions appear in Stewart and James (1982), Fransman and King (1984) 
and Journal of Development Economics (1984).
5. Baer (1962) provides a systematic summary and Flanders (1964) a 
useful critique of Prebisch's thesis. See also Black (1983).
6. An up-to-date survey of the literature on import substitution can 
be found in Colman and Nixon (1986, ch 9).
7. See also Fei and Ranis (1961) and Lewis (1972, 1979). A useful
interpretation of the Lewis model is given by Sen (1968).
8. See Taira (1966), ILO (1972) and World Bank (1983).
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9. Surveys of the literature can be found in Berry and Sabot (1978) 
and Journal of Development Economics (1985).
10. ILO (1972) and Truu and Black (1980).
11. Mackay (1971) and McCartan (1986).
12. Schultz (1961) and Becker (1964).
13. See references quoted in McCartan (1986).
14. Literature surveys are provided in Seers (1963a), Baer (1967), 
Patrick and Nixon (1976) and World Development (1982).
15. The policy implcations of structural inflation are well explained in 
Porter and Ranney (1982) and Taylor (1979, chs 3-5).
16. See footnote 6 above.
17. See Campos (1967), Ayre (1982) and Burton (1982).
18. Evans and Alizadeh (1984), Schmitz (1984) and Pack and Westphal 
(1986).
19. For example, the oil price hikes during the 1970's have encouraged 
a shift in manufacturing activity away from the western hemisphere 
towards low-wage regions in Southeast Asia.
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20. See, for example, Jolly et al (1973) and Chenery et al (1974).
21. For example, Adelman and Morris (1967).
22. In Friedman's (1966, p 14) words, such an approach is likely to 
explain "little by much". See Black (1981, pp 9-10).
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